Foreign ministers from 12 countries jointly condemned Israel's appointment of a diplomatic representative to Somaliland on 18 April, calling the move a "flagrant violation" of Somalia's sovereignty and warning it risks destabilizing the Horn of Africa — a charge Hargeisa swiftly rejected, asserting its right to conduct independent diplomacy.
The joint statement, issued by Pakistan, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Libya, Bangladesh, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Türkiye, Indonesia, and Kuwait , described Israel's recognition of Somaliland and the appointment of Ambassador designate Michael Lotem as a direct challenge to the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia .
The ministers warned that the move "sets a dangerous precedent that risks undermining stability in the Horn of Africa."
Israel formally recognized Somaliland as an independent state in late 2025 , making it one of the few countries to extend such recognition to the self-declared republic, which broke away from Somalia in 1991 but has never secured broad international acknowledgment of its statehood.
Somaliland's government responded from Hargeisa on 19 April , rejecting the condemnation and grounding its sovereignty claim in its original independence on 26 June 1960 — predating its union with the former Italian Somalia — and its reassertion of that independence in 1991. The statement cited over three decades of what it called peace, democratic governance, and responsible partnership, and called for a fact-based and pragmatic approach to its status, referencing the African Union's own findings on its case.
An earlier Somaliland statement on 16 April had rejected Somalia's claims over the territory as "unfounded in law, inaccurate in history."
The AU reference points to a 2005 African Union fact-finding mission that assessed Somaliland's situation as unique and self-justified among African secessionist cases. The AU, however, never acted on the mission's findings, and no AU member state has formally recognized Somaliland's independence.
The composition of the 12-nation bloc is as revealing as its statement. Egypt and Sudan — both engaged in significant tensions with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and broader Nile water politics — are signatories, as are Türkiye and Saudi Arabia , both of which have deepened security and economic partnerships with Mogadishu in recent years.
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The alignment echoes the diplomatic backlash that followed Ethiopia's January 2024 memorandum of understanding with Somaliland , in which Addis Ababa sought Red Sea port access through the Somaliland coast in exchange for a reported pathway to recognition. That deal drew sharp condemnation from Somalia and pulled Egypt and Türkiye more firmly into Mogadishu's orbit — the same constellation of actors now opposing Israel's engagement with Hargeisa.
Ethiopia is conspicuously absent from the condemning bloc, consistent with Addis Ababa's own engagement with Hargeisa. No official Ethiopian government statement on the Israel-Somaliland diplomatic exchange has been reported.
The dispute unfolds along the Red Sea corridor , one of the world's most strategically significant maritime routes, where competition among regional and global powers has intensified. The Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint , which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, sits at the intersection of these rivalries — with Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Somaliland all positioned along its shores. Houthi disruptions to Red Sea shipping since late 2023 have only raised the strategic premium on reliable partnerships along the corridor.
For Somaliland, Israel's recognition represents a rare diplomatic breakthrough after decades of international ambivalence. For Mogadishu and its allies, it represents a second direct challenge to Somali sovereignty in barely two years — following the Ethiopia MoU — and one that carries the additional charge of involving a state whose regional relationships are themselves deeply contested.
The factors to watch: whether the 12-nation statement generates any concrete diplomatic consequences — such as coordinated pressure at the UN or AU — or remains a declaratory exercise, and whether Israel proceeds to operationalize its Somaliland mission. Hargeisa's willingness to invoke the AU's own 2005 findings signals a government increasingly prepared to press its case on international legal grounds, even as the political environment grows more hostile.
